Is knowledge the same as justified true belief? In this Wireless Philosophy series, Jennifer Nagel discusses a Gettier case, a scenario in which someone has justified true belief but not knowledge. We’ll look at a Gettier case from Edmund Gettier’s famous 1963 paper on this topic, and a structurally similar case from 8th century Classical Indian philosophy.
Jennifer Nagel’s research focuses on knowledge, belief, and our capacities to track these states in ourselves and others. Prof. Nagel is interested in the history of epistemology, both in the Western tradition back to Plato, and in the Classical Indian and Tibetan traditions.
Geoff Pynn is an assistant professor of philosophy at Northern Illinois University. He received his PhD from Yale University. His research interests include epistemology and philosophy of language, and he regularly teaches courses in those areas, as well as logic and early modern philosophy.
Is knowledge the same as justified true belief? In this Wireless Philosophy video, Jennifer Nagel (University of Toronto) discusses a Gettier case, a scenario in which someone has justified true belief but not knowledge. We’ll look at a Gettier case from Edmund Gettier’s famous 1963 paper on this topic, and a structurally similar case from 8th century Classical Indian philosophy.
Is knowledge the same as justified true belief? In this Wireless Philosophy video, Jennifer Nagel (University of Toronto) discusses a Gettier case, a scenario in which someone has justified true belief but not knowledge. We’ll look at a Gettier case from Edmund Gettier’s famous 1963 paper on this topic, and a structurally similar case from 8th century Classical Indian philosophy.
Is knowledge a matter of being causally connected to the world in the right way? In this Wireless Philosophy video, Jennifer Nagel (University of Toronto) examines the causal theory of knowledge proposed by Alvin Goldman in 1967, and then discusses the problems with the causal theory that led Goldman to formulate his influential reliabilist theory of knowledge.
Problems for the causal theory of knowledge led epistemologists to propose that knowledge is a matter of tracking the truth. Fred Dretske and Robert Nozick developed this idea using counterfactual conditions. In this Wireless Philosophy video, Geoff Pynn (Northern Illinois University) examines the tracking idea, consider how it improves on the causal theory, and then discuss some well known objections to the theories advanced by Dretske and Nozick.
